Introduction
In common with many nations, Ireland has been subject to a perennial cycle of statutory and non-statutory regulation of the non-profit sector. One can identify with ease the major waves of statutory regulation that occurred in 1844, 1961 and 2009 respectively with the gap between regulatory bouts shortening in each successive wave. The stated purpose of these statutes remains remarkably consistent and aligned, implying either the continuation of a clear policy objective or a marked failure to attain the goal on the previous occasion such that the task must be tackled de novo. Thus, the Preamble to the Charitable Donations and Bequests Act (Ireland) 1844 declares that:
"Whereas it is expedient that the pious intentions of charitable persons should not be defeated by the concealment and misapplication of their donations and bequests to public and private charities in Ireland . . . and it is expedient and necessary that provision should be made for the better management of such charitable donations and bequests as have been heretofore made . . ." policymaker from taking proper account of important factors that continue to influence regulatory outcomes.
Part II reviews the pace of legislative reform in the charity sector, identifying key measures and trends and setting the context for Part III's discussion of the non-statutory measures of importance that influence the regulatory space. Part IV unpacks the hidden underbelly of the state/sector relationship, identifying key state-sector engagement, analysing where the balance of power lies and examining how this engagement has impacted on subsequent regulatory efforts. Part V brings these different strands together by exploring the causal links between them and the extent to which historical and political context dictates outcome before offering some conclusions on the nature of the cyclical relationship between statutory and non-statutory Irish charity regulation.
II. The Pace of Legislative Change: Key Measures and Trends in Charity Law
Legislative change comes slowly in Ireland and nowhere is this truer than in charity law reform.
The waves of charity legislation over the past three centuries have been well-spaced and surprisingly consistent in the quest for better regulation of charitable institutions. King George III tackled the matter in the 1763, introducing An Act for the Better Discovery of Charitable Forty years later, Queen Victoria signed into law the Commissioners and Charitable Donations and Bequests Act (Ireland) 1844, introducing a revised statutory committee that endured in the facilitation of charities and their operation until 2014. 5 The Act's purpose was to centralise responsibility for charity law. 6 It is noteworthy that the Preamble expressly referenced the insufficiency of the 1763 Act, which it repealed, to protect charitable donations and bequests.
Not without its own shortcomings, the 1844 Act was amended in 1867, 1871 and 1955; enactments that enlarged the Commissioners' powers. 7 The Charities Act 1961 repealed all of these earlier Acts but preserved the role and powers of the Commissioners; powers which were then subsequently enlarged in the Charities Act 1973. misapplied; and to certify cases to the Attorney General, these powers were little used. 9 The Act did not define an investigatory role for the Commissioners nor were they provided with sufficient resources to enable them to uncover instances of misapplied charitable property. 10
In summary, then, we have come full circle. From the introduction of a statutory register and a requirement of accountability subject to public inquiry in 1763 to the subsequent replacement of the committee of inquiry with a statutory body of commissioners in 1800 and the loss of the public register thereafter. From a shoring up of the Commissioners' facilitative role over a one hundred year period until 1961 to a further rethinking of the need for greater transparency and accountability with the 2009 Act's (re)introduction of a new charities register and the 7 establishment of a new statutory body with investigative and enforcement powers. The cyclical nature of legislation sees us once more attempting to tackle problems in 2014 first identified in 1763 and resorting to the very same tools of accountability and greater transparency.
III. Non-statutory Regulation: A late but welcome entrant to the non-profit arena
If one were to judge solely by the dates of the non-profit self-regulatory initiatives in Ireland, one might summarily conclude that non-statutory regulation is merely a belated afterthought.
Sectoral mobilisation around self-regulation is predominantly absent before the year 2000, attributable to the lack of peak representative bodies, an absence of sector capacity to create self-regulatory regimes, and a sectoral focus on supporting the development of statutory regulation. The post-2000 picture, however, sees not only the emergence of non-statutory regulation but its impact in areas of core regulatory interest, namely: fundraising regulation, governance and accountability.
A. Fundraising
The first of these twenty-first century self-regulation models to emerge was the establishment 
B. Governance
Prior to the Charities Act 2009, there was little statutory guidance for charities on probity and accountability matters. The Act introduces a necessary regulatory framework but many of the important substantive details require further delegated legislation. Legislative vacuums can lead to poor governance practices, a concern charities readily acknowledge. 21 Building upon the Dóchas Code, a broader colloboration of non-profit interests developed a more sophisticated governance code model to tackle areas of common concern across the Irish non-profit sector. 23 Developed between 2009-11 and launched in 2012, the Non-profit Governance Code boasts 213 signatories with a further 746 organizations on the journey towards full compliance. 24 The code focuses on five key areas -organization leadership, exercise of control, accountability and transparency, working effectively and behaving with integrity. It caters for three different organizational types that vary according to size, turnover and staffing levels. Developed on a 'comply or explain' basis, the code drills down to specific requirements from ensuring proper internal financial and management controls are in place to encouraging review of all organizational policies, from volunteer policies through to conflict of interest policies. Of the self-regulatory codes discussed in this chapter, this Governance
Code is the best known in the sector with the highest sign-up rates, although the number remains a small fraction of tax-exempt charities.
Two cautionary notes must be sounded. The first relates to oversight. Signatories to the code self-assess their own compliance and renew their adherence to the code annually but the code makes no provision for any external monitoring or enforcement. The Wheel, a network organization for the voluntary sector, acts as the Working Group's secretariat. The Working
Group's responsibility is expressed in the following terms:
"The organisations involved in the Working Group share the responsibility for guarding the standards in this Code. They have a written agreement on this. How this experience will be gathered or analysed is unexplained and whether the numbers of signatories will drop dramatically when the list is reset after the 12-month time period to include only those who have recommitted remains to be seen. 26 The biggest challenge, particularly in the absence of a clear oversight mechanism, will be in proving that signatories have gone further in self-reflective practices than merely signing and returning the Principles Statement sign-up sheet.
The second cautionary note concerns the current public mistrust of charities arising from recent charity scandals that highlighted exceptionally poor goverance and accountability practices of some leading charities. 27 Following these governance scandals, public donations to many charities in 2014 fell significantly. 28 The public may not therefore view self-regulation as sufficient in an area as important as governance, encompassing as it does matters relating to mission delivery, stewardship and financial probity. Moreover, the 2014 Institute of Directors Governance Survey notes that "it is extremely concerning that . . . two-thirds [of charity respondents] believe that organizations in receipt of State funding are not adequately monitored or held to account for the appropriation of these funds. This is particularly worrying given that 26 
C. Reporting and Accountability
The final non-profit sector initiative of note is the Irish Nonprofits Knowledge Exchange project ('INKEx'), which set out to create an authoritative source of statistical data on Irish non-profits for a wide variety of users in the public, private and third sectors. 30 The main purpose of this initiative was information disclosure rather than self-regulation. Piloted with EU funding in 2007, the initial objective of the project was to explore whether a GuideStar model could work in a number of countries, including Ireland. Developed as a non-profit entity and funded by the Irish government and other philanthropic sources, INKEx undertook a three-
year project to design, test, build and launch a free searchable website with extensive regulatory data on Irish charities and non-profits, built on a new, custom-built database.
The database went live in November 2011, with a medium term plan to use a mixture of grants and service fees to fund its operations. It was originally envisaged that the database could provide the "back office" for the Charities Regulatory Authority ('CRA') upon its establishment. 31 and to re-establish a single digital repository of non-profit financial, governance and other relevant data and documents is noteworthy. 34 How this non-statutory reporting mechanism will sit alongside the separate and evolving Charities Register remains to be determined. 35
D. Self-Regulatory Outcomes
The trend of non-profit self-regulation in Ireland has been to focus on important areas that normally fall within the statutory regulatory space. Although coming late to the scene, with non-statutory regulation first emerging in the early 2000s, certain non-profit leaders invested much time and effort in the development of codes and non-statutory approaches that have garnered praise internationally for their innovative and consultative form. To date, implementation success rates have not mirrored the level of effort invested. regulation will need to prove its effectiveness and capacity to self-enforce in the medium term in order to be an adequate supplement or alternative to statutory measures.
IV. Undercurrents influencing the Relationships between State and Sector
Unlike other common law jurisdictions, 36 to grapple with secular organizations focused on issues of social exclusion, a domain the state viewed as extremely political and off-limits. A new regulatory framework was thus necessary as much to contain, as to manage, these actors.
1971 to 2000: From NSSC to Comhairle
In 1971 
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The NSSB's role was further diluted in 2000 when it was merged with the National Rehabilitation Board to form Comhairle, an agency tasked with combining the NSSB's citizen information role with assisting and supporting disabled individuals to identify their needs and access their social service entitlements. 51 The 20-year mutation of NSSC to NSSB and ultimately to Comhairle did little to achieve the initial aims of the agency. With each successive transformation the ability to act as a coordinating hub for non-profit action was reduced or lost. The political landscape throughout most of this period was one in which the state had no clear defined relationship with the non-profit sector despite repeated government commitments to review how the state and the sector might better work together.
1975 to 2011: The Combat Poverty Agency
In The CPA's significance for the non-profit sector was more inspirational than financial.
According to Acheson, its importance "lay in the agency's support for community-based and Its belated appearance was prompted more by EU developments than any domestic initiative to define the state-voluntary sector relationship. 63 Among its objectives the Green Paper sought to:
• Clarify the responsibilities of different Departments to the non-profit sector;
• Examine the effectiveness of existing programmes and support structures;
• Introduce Customer Charters in relation to specific social services and provide training for the statutory sector;
• Develop statements of good practice for both statutory and voluntary sectors. 64
The subsequent White Paper on Supporting Voluntary Activity in 2000 gave formal recognition to the sector's role in "contributing to the creation of a vibrant, participative democracy" and provided for the establishment of a joint Implementation and Advisory Group ("IAG"), comprising both state and non-profit sector representatives, to oversee its implementation. 65 In broad terms, the IAG was an experiment in blue-skies thinking -inviting state and sector representatives to work together to improve state-sector relations in a mutually beneficial way. To this extent, the IAG process differed from Social Partnership (discussed below) because the IAG process was a vested interest process. It concentrated solely on improving the relationship between the state and voluntary sector. By common consensus, however, the IAG experience was not a happy or productive one. working and that, if anything, the experience had deepened the distrust between statutory bodies and the non-profit sector by reinforcing a perception of "them" and "us."
It is hard to identify policy changes towards the state/sector relationship directly attributable to the IAG. Government officials claimed that the White Paper (and implicitly the IAG) achieved greater state funding of the sector although it would be difficult to draw a causal connection in this regard. On the contrary, CV 12 members were quick to list the IAG's wasted opportunities to influence policy change. With regard to supplementary outcomes, such as enhanced interaction between stakeholders or the nurturing of ideas for future cooperation, the IAG offered little collaborative benefit. Rather, relations between IAG partners deteriorated towards the end to one of ambivalence, if not quite hostility.
Evaluating the IAG's achievements against its initial terms of reference, it achieved little in its research and funding role. Government cuts eliminated the IAG's budget for sector research and reduced the training budget. The IAG's poorly run adjudication process for awarding training grants damaged state/sector relations. The IAG also failed to produce any codes of practice or manuals on funding.
The IAG's involvement in advising government on regulatory matters fared equally badly.
Early on in the IAG's lifetime, the government transferred the charity regulatory reform brief from the IAG to a Departmental charities regulation unit. In those regulatory areas left to the IAG, little progress was made. No agreement was reached on standard protocols for financial accountability for state funding of the sector. With regard to policy matters affecting the broader state/sector relationship, apart from limited progress on support of volunteering, the Government policy. However, the context in which the White Paper policy is to be implemented has clearly changed with time.") dearth of IAG meetings prevented regular monitoring or reform of the administrative mechanisms that were meant to underpin the functioning of the voluntary sector/state relationship. Partnership paralysis set in.
1996-2010: Recent Rounds of Partnership
Social partnership describes a national deliberative and bargaining process conducted between the government and four Social Partner groupings (known as "pillars") -the trade unions, the employers' confederations, the farming bodies and, from 1996 onwards, the community and voluntary sector. The purpose of Social Partnership was to negotiate an agreement between the parties that set out a socio-economic strategy for Ireland for the subsequent three years.
This strategy addressed not only economic concerns relating to taxation, worker productivity and wage levels but also social concerns relating to the reduction of long-term unemployment, poverty and social exclusion.
Social Partnership existed as a process for more than 10 years without the participation of the non-profit sector. Admission to the process, which was by government invitation only, did not initially extend to non-profits because the existing players (the business, union and farming pillars) and government viewed Ireland's problems as economic problems requiring an economic solution. The definition of the problem and the shape of the solution changed overtime. Measurement of societal success as something broader than just economic prosperity achievable through collective wage bargaining forced the social partners to tackle structural issues relating to social exclusion, namely, the challenges presented by disadvantaged communities and the problems of long-term unemployment. 69 Acceptance of this agenda, however, opened the door to non-profit sector participation. 70
Prior to joining social partnership in 1996, non-profit participation in policymaking ranged from direct political access for elite players to outside lobbying by less well-connected nonprofits. The policy impact achieved in both cases tended to be ad hoc and limited. Significant changes in the ways that government reached out to the sector at national and local level occurred in the 1990s with the creation of National Economic and Social Forum ('NESF') and
Area Based Partnerships (ABPs). Both vehicles offered non-profits a formal, if still limited, role in policymaking. By making non-profit representatives equal players alongside business, union and government officials, NESF and the ABPs raised the sector's profile. This greater role for the sector in policy deliberation gave rise to tensions with other established players;
tensions reflected in local councilors' mistrust of non-profits at ABP level and the lack of priority placed by unions and employers on the NESF at a national level.
In 1996, following ten years of informal involvement and lobbying for admission, the Irish 
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V.
Contextualising the Third Strand: The Glue that holds the Process together or the Quicksand in which it is stuck?
The value of these various forms of collaboration through the IAG, the CV Pillar of Social Partnership, NESF and NESC -whether viewed as partnership, consultation, cooption -lay in the opportunities presented to CV representatives to gain new negotiation skills, to participate in the decision-making process and to be part of a political process beyond the lobbying threshold. For the first time, the tangibility of the sector began to emerge through the necessary processes of selecting representatives for both IAG and Social Partnership processes. Political experiences taught the parties of the need to bring your constituents with you and the importance of good personal relations with your counterparts and not just your colleagues.
Experience in not reaching agreement, particularly in the Social Partnership process, brought home to non-profits the value and challenges inherent in dissent. The rediscovery of the dissenting voice towards the end of Social Partnership in many ways laid the groundwork for the subsequent research of the Advocacy Initiative. 80 Another important lesson that emerged from the collaborative experiences was the non-profit realisation that the first party to fill a policy vacuum gains the upper hand in influencing, if not dictating, the shape of the future policy solution. ICTR used this lesson to its advantage in undertaking its feasibility study on the sector's ability to regulate public fundraising while The Wheel and Boardmatch adopted a similar approach in their development of the Non-profit Governance Code, both of which emerged post the Social Partnership era.
Although the third strand of collaboration itself did not necessarily hinge upon matters of charity regulation, the sector's involvement in this arena inevitably influenced all stakeholders.
The partnership space provided an incubator for non-profit leaders who, up until this time, had little experience of working together as a sector or engaging with the state on a multilateral consensual basis. It allowed sector representatives to witness and participate in high-level negotiations between the trade unions, business and the state and again to learn from their partner peers. These experiences changed the attitudes of those involved both in terms of how the parties sought to represent themselves and their capacity to contribute. It awakened the state's realisation of the sector's potential, crystallising those areas in which the state was happy to involve the sector and those areas in which it was less enamoured.
Looking at any one event in isolation might lead one wrongly to assume that failure was the only outcome. It is true that on each occasion outlined the interaction fell short of its initial aims. Comhairle today is a pale imitator of what the NSSC was established to be in the 1970s.
The Combat Poverty Agency, despite its valiant efforts, has been reincorporated into the Department of Social Protection. The White Paper's IAG -the closest the sector has come to a vested interest regulatory process -was not successful and left a bad taste in the mouths of all those involved. Social Partnership, while having its highs for those selected to sit in the inner circle, created a greater feeling of mistrust amongst the broader non-profit community of elite players looking after themselves and forging their own political connections.
And yet, it is arguable that these failed process experiences enabled the non-profit sector, and particularly the leaders in that sector to mature and positioned them to take up the core areas of governance and fundraising regulation that currently occupy the self-regulatory space by 32 raising their profiles and making them more credible participants in the regulatory game. The shifting pendulum of power from religious non-profits' domination of the early twentieth century to the State from the 1970s onwards, leading to secular non-profits' emergence on the policy scene during the 1970s-1980s, right up to the formal entrance of non-profits in the policymaking sphere in 1990s-2000s forms the background to today's regulatory context.
To turn then to preliminary conclusions: on the cycle of regulation, where does Ireland currently stand? The recent emergence of non-statutory regulation in the core areas of fundraising and governance has proved an interesting development. Whereas the initiative for both came from the sector, the state financially supported the fundraising project to a large extent. This support has not, however, ensured its successful implementation. If anything, the opposite has occurred: given its high financial dependency on the state, a downturn in financial support hindered an effective high-profile rollout. Moreover, a reverse-form of regulatory capture is evident in ICTR's failure to commence the proposed monitoring regime in light of the Department of Justice's request to delay the Monitoring Group's establishment pending the Charities Act's commencement. In contrast, the governance project, developed and financially supported by the sector, has had a higher public profile and managed to engage more nonprofits. Although it faces its own enforcement challenges, the code's rollout has been more effective. It remains to be seen whether without an annual income, the code will be selfsustaining.
The impetus to develop these codes, along with a non-profit reporting framework for charities, following a 12-year wait for charity law reform, demonstrates that there are non-profit leaders who have been prepared to take the initiative when it comes to charity regulation. Many, although not all, have been involved in the earlier state-sector collaborations through Social Partnership, NESF and the White Paper IAG. It is arguable that their experiences and exposure to political and regulatory decision-making enabled these individuals and their organizations to play a larger role in the sector's self-regulation; important in a sector that does not have a recognised representative body.
From a pure statutory regulation perspective, the Irish government approach over the centuries has been one conscious of the pitfalls of non-regulation but uncomfortable legislating for strong regulators. 81 The former Commissioners for Charitable Donations and Bequests were never given the powers or resources to act as investigator, making their enforcement powers nugatory. The new Charities Regulatory Authority will not be an omnipotent presence in this regard either. Unlike many of its common law counterparts, it will require court authorisation to exercise many of its powers. Even the newly created Charities Appeal Tribunal will not transform matters as its jurisdiction is mirrored on the CRA's exercise of power and is thus mainly restricted to reviewing registration or refusal decisions.
The rationale for such a light touch approach, particularly following recent domestic charity scandals that revealed shocking disregard for public funding 82 may, to some degree, lie in the state's past overreliance on charities to deliver public services in the areas of health, education and social welfare. When charitable provision is core rather than supplementary, a finding of lack of probity would undermine the ability to deliver "essential" (rather than charitable) services. In the absence of an alternative state system of delivery, such a finding would not only be damning but also crippling for service provision and have far larger political consequences.
81 Acheson et al, n. 6, Breen, Non-profit Law Yearbook, n. 27.
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The limited resources available not only for regulatory purposes but also historically for service delivery purposes means that for the foreseeable future, consultation and cooperation remain necessary for success on both fronts. While the Charities Act 2009 will provide the necessary skeleton on which to hang the regulatory framework, the input of stakeholders willing to lead the way on governance, reporting and fundraising standards will be vital to the regime's future sustainability. The emergence of a symbiotic relationship between state and sector would be mutually beneficial. It would not be without its challenges both for the State (in allowing stakeholders' autonomy in areas in which the state is uncomfortable to be criticised) and the sector (in learning to charge and sanction its own constituents for both access to and breach of a regulatory regime). The time, however, is ripe for the next wave combining state and sector initiatives to break forth upon Irish shores.
